FIRST DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 160675
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
PANGANIBAN,
C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
COURT OF APPEALS (Sixteenth AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Division) and NICOMEDES CALLEJO,
SR., and
ARMILLA,
DELIA BATASIN-IN, CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
JAMES FUENTES, OSCAR
GADOR, SANTOS GUIGAYOMA,
JR., CLARITO
MIÑOZA,
ERNESTO
NARAJA, NELSON
OBESO,* SENEN SERIÑO, and
Promulgated:
MARTIN YASE,
Respondents.
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CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The
Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1]
dated
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria
Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a
criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein
Edmondo Arregadas, Nicomedes Armilla, Delia Batasin-in, James Fuentes, Oscar
Gador, Santos Guigayoma, Jr., Clarito Miñoza, Nelson Obeso,
Senen Seriño, Ernesto Naraja, and Martin Yase, all employees of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad,
It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the parcel of land owned by the Corominas family without seeking permission from the latter or their representative and despite the big “NO TRESPASSING” sign attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said property.
Except
for Arregadas, who executed his own affidavit, Armilla, et al. executed a joint counter-affidavit decrying the charge
against them as malicious, unfounded and untrue. By way of refutation, they alleged that they
entered the Corominas landholding pursuant to the Order dated
The said Order stated:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Grants the
Motion. The Court hereby orders the
relocation survey of the questioned lots and the
SO ORDERED.[2]
In compliance
with the foregoing order, the DENR Regional Executive Director issued Travel Order
Nos. 99-10-19, 11-01, and 99-11-11 authorizing Armilla, et al. to “conduct relocation survey of the corners of Proclamation
No. 56, S-36 and Lot No. 18454, Cad. 12 Ext.”[3] Consequently, on
The
following day, the DENR Survey Team, the members of the PNP and two barangay tanods of Sudlon II,
To
establish and monument corners 20 and 21, the DENR Survey Team asked permission
from a person inside Lot No. 18466 to be allowed to put a stake inside the said
lot to serve as a traverse station. On
The
DENR Survey Team then submitted its Report[4]
dated
Armilla,
et al. concluded their joint
counter-affidavit by vehemently denying the charge that they, conspiring with
each other, trespassed on the Corominas property. They maintained that they were merely acting
in the performance of their official functions and complying with a court
order. Moreover, they could not defy the
said court order and the travel orders, lest they be punished for contempt of
court or subjected to disciplinary action.
They intimated that the sole reason that complainants filed the charge
against them was to prevent the DENR from filing a reversion case against the
owners of Lot No. 18466, a portion of which was ascertained to be within the
For his part,
Arregadas averred in his counter-affidavit that he was not part of the DENR
Survey Team tasked to relocate and monument the western boundary corners of the
In the
Resolution[7]
dated
However, in the
administrative case (OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044), the Office of the Ombudsman rendered
the Decision[8]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is hereby deemed that respondents, namely: Nicomedes Rivera
Ar[m]illa; Delia Batasin-in; James Magalona Fuentes; Oscar Tatongoy Gador;
Santos Guigayoma, Jr.; Clarito Umerez Minoza; Ernesto Subingsubing Naraja;
Nelson Obeso; Senen Calaurian Sereno; and, Martin Yococa Yase are guilty of
Simple Misconduct, and are hereby meted the penalty of suspension for one
month.
The complaint against
Edmondo Ar[r]egadas is hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[9]
A
motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by Armilla, et al. but the same was denied
by the Office of the Ombudsman in the Order[10]
dated
Armilla,
et al. thus filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman in finding
them guilty of simple misconduct and imposing on them the penalty of one month
suspension. They alleged that they could
not be guilty of simple misconduct considering that they simply complied with a
court order and directive of their superiors for them to conduct a relocation
survey of the
the Corominas family over a parcel of land within the said park was still in
issue; hence, no right of the said family had been violated in conducting the
court-ordered survey. Armilla, et al. also assailed the denial of their
motion for reconsideration on the ground that under Republic Act No. 6770 (RA
6770)[11]
a decision imposing the penalty of not more than one month is final and
unappealable.
In
its Decision dated
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari
is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman dated
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman forthwith sought recourse to this Court.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
In support of its petition, the Office of the Ombudsman (the petitioner) alleges as follows:
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT
OF APPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS DECISION DATED
(I) THE PASSING STATEMENT IN
TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN,
G.R. NO. 129124,
(II) SEC. 13, ART. XI OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION VESTS THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN NOT ONLY WITH THE AUTHORITY
TO “RECOMMEND” ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS ON ERRING PUBLIC SERVANTS BUT ALSO WITH
THE POWER TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ITS “RECOMMENDATION”; FURTHER, IT IS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTENDMENT TO LEAVE TO THE LEGISLATURE THE PREROGATIVE TO
FURTHER DEFINE OR REINFORCE SUCH ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY;
(III) SECS. 13, 15(1) AND
(3), 16, 19, 21, AND 25 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989)
CLOTHE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WITH ALL THE CONCOMITANT PREROGATIVES OF A
POWER TO DISCIPLINE, INCLUDING THE POWER TO ASSESS PENALTIES AND TO CAUSE THE
SAME TO BE MINISTERIALLY IMPLEMENTED BY THE CONCERNED AGENCY, AND WHICH FULL ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY POWER HAS TIME AND TIME AGAIN BEEN VALIDATED AND AFFIRMED BY THE
HONORABLE COURT;
(IV) THE GENERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS
SIMILAR TO ITS PLENARY AND UNQUALIFIED CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORY POWER, INCLUDES
THE LESSER POWER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF DULY-ISSUED JUDGMENTS; AND
(V) A GENERAL APPLICATION OF
THE TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM LEADS TO
PARALYZING CONFUSION, LEGAL CHAOS AND UNREASONABLE ABSURDITIES, AS WELL AS TO
THE ACCELERATION OF THE CRIPPLING AND DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF INEFFICIENCY AND
GRAFT AND CORRUPTION.[14]
Petitioner assails the appellate court’s reliance on Tapiador in declaring that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is limited only to the recommendation of the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. According to petitioner, the statement made by the Court in Tapiador relating to the Office of the Ombudsman’s lack of authority to impose a penalty is mere obiter dictum.
Petitioner submits that apart from the powers and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman enumerated in the Constitution, it expressly authorized Congress to grant the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers. Pursuant to this constitutional fiat, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6770 vesting in the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary powers. Citing the pertinent provisions[15] in Republic Act No. 6770, petitioner posits that it possesses the following powers: “(1) [it] can, on its own, investigate any apparent illegality, irregularity, impropriety, or inefficiency committed by any public officer or employee not excepted from its disciplinary authority; (2) it can and must act on administrative complaints against them; (3) it can conduct administrative adjudication proceedings; (4) it can determine their guilt; (5) at its discretion, it can fix the penalty in case of guilt; (6) it can order the head of the office or agency to which the guilty public officer belongs to implement the penalty imposed; and (7) it can ensure compliance with the implementation of the penalty it fixed.”[16]
By declaring that the Office of the Ombudsman can only recommend, but cannot directly impose, the penalty in administrative cases, the appellate court allegedly, in effect, nullified and invalidated the provisions of Republic Act No. 6770 relating to its administrative disciplinary powers. Stated in another manner, the appellate court has allegedly deemed that the Office of the Ombudsman cannot make a determination of guilt for an administrative offense; it cannot assess a penalty; and it cannot cause its decisions to be implemented.
Petitioner stresses that the grant of administrative disciplinary authority to the Office of the Ombudsman is not prohibited by, or inconsistent with, the Constitution. It invokes the legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 to buttress its claim that it was the intention of the lawmakers to provide for an independent constitutional body that would serve as “the protector of the people” with “real powers.”[17]
Petitioner opines that the statutory grant of disciplinary powers to the Office of the Ombudsman – complete in all its components including the determination of guilt, assessment of commensurate penalty and compulsion on the head of agency concerned to implement the same under pain of administrative sanctions – was encouraged and ushered in by the Constitution.[18] Further, its framers intended the Office of the Ombudsman to exercise disciplinary authority as an indispensable and major rampart in its operational effectiveness.
In this connection, petitioner reiterates that this disciplinary authority necessarily includes the authority to determine the penalty in an administrative proceeding and cause its implementation. Specifically, Section 13[19] of Republic Act No. 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the authority to enforce administrative liability where the evidence warrants. Section 15[20] provides, in the alternative, that the Ombudsman may proceed administratively against an erring public officer and threatens with administrative sanction the refusal of any officer, without just cause, to implement the order of the Ombudsman imposing administrative penalties. Section 25[21] prescribes the range of penalties that the Ombudsman may enforce against public officers it finds administratively guilty. Finally, Section 27[22] pronounces as not susceptible to review on appeal administrative penalties not higher than suspension for thirty (30) days or fine not exceeding the salary for the same period.
Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution is also cited by petitioner. The said provision reads that the Ombudsman has the authority “to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.” According to petitioner, the clause “ensure compliance therewith” taken together with the term “recommend” connotes an element of compulsion such that the latter does not merely signify “to advise” or “to prescribe.” Rather, the clause “ensure compliance therewith” prescribes that the Ombudsman procedurally pass on to the head of office concerned the imposition of the penalty on the public officer at fault, and then compels said head to enforce the same penalty. This element of compulsion, petitioner theorizes, was provided by the framers of the Constitution in order to keep the Ombudsman from becoming a “toothless tiger,” a “eunuch” or a “scarecrow.”[23]
It
is petitioner’s submission that a contrary ruling, i.e., to limit its power only to recommend the penalty in
administrative disciplinary cases, would lead to legal and practical
absurdities. Among them, it would
allegedly run counter to the fact that the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent constitutional body.
Likewise, heads of office, e.g.,
a municipal mayor, would have the authority to adopt or reject the Ombudsman’s
decision, as if in review, when no such recourse is provided by law. The problem of how the various administrative
penalties that have already been enforced by the Office of the Ombudsman would
be treated was also raised.
In fine, petitioner maintains that it meted a just and commensurate disciplinary penalty of one-month suspension on Armilla, et al. upon its finding that they were guilty of simple misconduct. Such finding was arrived at by petitioner in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority and only after proper adjudication proceedings. The appellate court, in reversing this judgment on the sole ground that petitioner has no authority to impose the penalty but merely to recommend it citing the obiter dictum in Tapiador, allegedly committed reversible error. Petitioner thus urges this Court to reverse and set aside the assailed appellate court’s decision and to affirm the Office of the Ombudsman’s authority to impose the penalty in OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044.
The Respondents’ Counter-Arguments
Armilla, et al. (the respondents) maintain that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to impose administrative sanctions on erring public officials. It is their position that subparagraph (8) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which states that the Ombudsman shall “perform such other functions or duties as may be provided by law” is circumscribed by subparagraph (3) thereof which enjoins the Ombudsman to recommend the removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of public officials found to be at fault.
According to respondents, subparagraph (8) of Section 13, Article XI is a catch-all phrase intended to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman such other powers necessary to discharge its function as the constitutional watchdog of the government. However, the said provision does not include powers inconsistent with those already enumerated. Hence, its recommendatory power to impose penalties in subparagraph (3) of the same section necessarily forecloses the grant of the power to actually impose the said penalties.
Refuting petitioner’s assertion that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the Office of the Ombudsman to be more than a recommendatory institution, respondents aver that the clear intent was to deny the Ombudsman punitive powers. In support of this averment, respondents refer to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission where some members thereof said that the Ombudsman was to have neither prosecutory nor punitive powers.
Respondents further submit that Republic Act No. 6770 withheld punitive powers from the Office of the Ombudsman and merely authorized it to recommend or suggest sanctions. They cite Section 15 thereof particularly subparagraph (3) thus:
SEC. 15. Powers,
Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
x x
x x
(3) Direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21 of this Act; Provided, That the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be
ground for disciplinary action against said officer;
Again refuting petitioner’s argument that the term “recommend” construed together with the clause “ensure compliance therewith” imports an element of compulsion and warrants direct imposition by the Office of the Ombudsman of the penalties, respondents contend that to recommend necessarily excludes the power to directly impose the penalty. Echoing the appellate court’s ruling, respondents invoke Tapiador in arguing that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to directly impose on them the penalty of suspension for one month, but only to recommend the said penalty. Accordingly, they pray that the petition be denied for utter lack of merit.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In declaring that the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, the appellate court mainly relied on the following statement made by the Court in Tapiador, thus:
x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the
petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in
the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph
3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only “recommend”
the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the
public official concerned.[24]
Reliance by the appellate court on the foregoing statement is misplaced. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the foregoing statement is mere obiter dictum. In fact, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court categorically pronounced that the statement in Tapiador on the Ombudsman’s power “is, at best, merely an obiter dictum” and, as such, “cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme Court:”
x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.[26]
Likewise in Ledesma, the Court rejected the argument that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to “recommend” to the officer concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term “recommend,” according to the Court, the said provision, construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
The Court further explained in Ledesma that the mandatory character of the Ombudsman’s order imposing a sanction should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman “recommends” the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer.
Consequently in Ledesma, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision which had, in turn, affirmed an order of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of suspension on the erring public official.
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
The mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman is expressed in Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution in this wise:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors
of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.
Section 13 thereof vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned and controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law to furnish it with copies
of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information
necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary,
pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government and make recommendations
for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and
efficiency; and
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,[27] the Court recognized that the foregoing enumeration is not exclusive and that the framers of the Constitution had given Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional powers to the Ombudsman. The observation of Commissioner Christian Monsod, quoted in Acop, is apropos:
MR. MONSOD
(reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):
May we just state that
perhaps the honorable Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an
absolutist position. The Ombudsman is
seen as a civil advocate or a champion of the citizens against the bureaucracy,
not against the President. On one hand,
we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things. On the other hand, there is the
interpretation that he is a competitor to the President, as if he is being
brought up to the same level as the President.
With respect to the argument
that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the
concept in its form at the present, but
we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think
that at this time we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at
some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.[28]
Congress thus enacted Republic Act No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. It substantially reiterates the constitutional provisions relating to the Office of the Ombudsman. Further, Section 13 thereof restates the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman in this wise:
Sec. 13. Mandate. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
Section 15 thereof substantially reiterates Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution. In particular, subparagraph (3) of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770 restates Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution, quoted anew below:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
x x x x
(3) Direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith; or
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure or prosecute an officer or employee who is at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. It is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution.[29] In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints:
Sec. 19. Administrative
Complaints. – The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not
limited, to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or
regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair,
oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the
general course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of
law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of
discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular,
immoral or devoid of justification.
Other provisions
in Republic Act No. 6770, likewise, pertain to the exercise by the Office of
the Ombudsman of its administrative disciplinary authority. For example, Section 19 states that Republic Act
No. 6770 shall
apply “to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have
been committed by any officer or employee x x x, during his tenure of
office.” Section 21 defines the
jurisdiction of its disciplinary authority to include “all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned, or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except
over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress,
and the Judiciary.”
Section 22[30] thereof vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate any serious misconduct in the office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. Such power, likewise, includes the investigation of private persons who conspire with public officers and employees. Section 23[31] requires that the administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. The Office of the Ombudsman is, however, given the option to refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees.
Still in connection with their administrative disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and his deputies are expressly given the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. – The Ombudsman
and his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of
duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Section 25 thereof sets forth the penalties as follows:
Sec. 25. Penalties. – (1) In administrative
proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules provided
therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the
penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or
both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration
circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or
employee found guilty of the complaint or charges.
As referred to in the above provision, under Presidential Decree No. 807,[32] the penalties that may be imposed by the disciplining authority in administrative disciplinary cases are removal from the service, transfer, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six months’ salary, or reprimand.[33]
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 provides for the period of effectivity and finality of the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. –
(1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately
effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration
of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be
filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the
order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing: Provided, That only one
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of facts by the
Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable.
[In all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.][34]
The above rules may be
amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice
may require.
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.
The explanation of Senator Edgardo Angara, one of the sponsors of Senate Bill No. 534 which, as consolidated with House Bill No. 13646, became RA 6770, is instructive:
Senator Laurel. Because, Mr. President, in
the light of another section of the bill, with respect to Section 13,
disciplinary authority, first, the Ombudsman here is granted the power of
disciplining public officers and employees, while other bodies may not be so
authorized; second, the Constitution itself empowers the Office of the
Ombudsman merely to investigate and review; but the bill here authorizes the
Ombudsman, and grants the power of disciplining public officers and employees.
It goes beyond the constitutional provision.
Senator
Angara. Well, if the Gentleman is
through with his statement…
Senator
Laurel. Well, yes.
Senator Angara. I do not agree that this bill is going beyond what the Constitution has prescribed for the Ombudsman; because, as I understand it, the constitutional provision was construed in the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission and in fact, left it to the Legislature to determine the powers and functions to be allocated to the Ombudsman. It did not say or it did not prohibit the Legislature from granting disciplinary power that we are now granting to the Ombudsman. But over and beyond that interpretation, Mr. President, is the question that one must always ask, if he wants this institution of the Ombudsman to be effective, rather than simply be like the other watchdogs the past administrations created. Then we believe, the Committee believes, that we must give the Ombudsman the necessary teeth in order to implement its own decision. We believe that this is fully in accord with the Filipino custom and tradition, and based on our historical experience. Short of not giving the Ombudsman the disciplining authority, I think we might as well kiss the system goodbye, because it will be like the same watchdogs created in the past-toothless and inutile.[35]
Senator Angara, by way of reply to the queries of Senator Neptali Gonzales, further explained:
Senator Gonzales. All right. There are certain admissions and, however
reluctantly given, at least, let us go further because the Gentleman is
invoking the whole of Section 13. I
might really be wrong, and I want to be corrected this early.
Now, under paragraph (2), it says:
Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision thereof to perform and expedite…
probably a ministerial act
because it says:
… any act or duty required by law or to
stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties.
There is neither a grant of disciplining
authority, nor can we imply one from this specific provision; only from this
specific provision.
Senator Angara. My answer, again, Mr. President, is that one
cannot derive that broad, sweeping conclusion solely on the basis of this
provision.
Senator Gonzales. There is none solely on
this provision. Let us go to (3):
Direct the officer concerned
to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault - -
There is a determination, that is, at
fault, and this is very important,
-recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Mr. President, the power here, even
after a determination of fault, is merely to recommend to the appropriate
office or agency the imposition of administrative sanctions, which, under this
law, instead are to be imposed by the Ombudsman himself or directly. Could not the Gentleman see a conflict
between these two provisions, Mr. President?
Senator
Angara. I do not see any conflict, Mr. President. As I said, the grant of disciplinary power is
something that the Constitution does not forbid.
Senator
Gonzales. Well, we will take it differently.
Senator Angara. Again,
the question is: Is it necessary to grant the Ombudsman such a power in order
to make it effective? That is a means
necessary to the end, to the objective.
Senator Gonzales. Is it, therefore, now
another power?
Senator Angara. I
submit that the means, that is, the disciplinary power, is necessary to
achieving that objective of making an effective Ombudsman.[36]
The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be “an activist watchman,” not merely a passive one.[37] And this intent was given validation by the Court in Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[38] where it stated that:
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman
departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive
and process the people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive government
personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as
protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public
officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on
anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed
by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad
powers to enable him to implement his own actions. x x x
At this point, it is noted that the Office of the Ombudsman and the appellate court invariably found respondents guilty of simple misconduct. The Court affirms this finding following the salutary rule that factual findings of administrative bodies are accorded great respect by this Court.[39]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
* Also Neilson Obiso in some pleadings.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (now retired), with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arturo D. Brion, concurring; rollo, pp. 79-86.
[2] Records, p. 24.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Penned by GIO I Quijano, with GIO III
Santiago recommending approval. The same
was approved by Deputy Ombudsman Miro on
[9]
[10]
[11] Otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
[12] 429 Phil. 47, 58 (2002).
[13] Rollo, p. 86.
[14]
[15] Among others, Sections 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25. Infra.
[16] Rollo, p. 298.
[17]
[18]
[19] Infra.
[20] Infra.
[21] Infra.
[22] Infra.
[23] Rollo, pp. 322-323.
[24] Supra note 12, at 58.
[25] G.R.
No. 161629,
[26]
[27] G.R.
Nos. 120422 and 120428,
[28] II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 295. Also cited in Acop, id. at 579.
[29] Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica, 372
Phil. 892, 903 (1999).
[30] The provision reads:
Sec. 22. Investigatory Power. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.
[31] The provision reads:
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. – (1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.
(2)
At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints
to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees, which shall be
terminated within the period prescribed in the Civil Service Law. Any delay without just cause in acting on any
referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for
administrative action against the officers or employees to whom such referrals
are addressed and shall constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of not
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
(3) In any investigation under this Act, the Ombudsman may (a) enter and inspect the premises of any office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine and have access to any book, record, file, document or paper; and (c) hold private hearings with both the complaining individual and the official concerned.
[32] Entitled Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and For Other Purposes.
[33]
[34] This specific paragraph, insofar as it prescribes direct appeal to the Supreme Court of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, has been struck down as unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
[35] RECORD
OF THE SENATE, Vol. II, No. 5,
[36] RECORD
OF THE SENATE, Vol. II, No. 6,
[37]
[38] G.R.
Nos. 105965-70,
[39] Office of the Ombudsman v. Florentina Santos, G.R. No. 166116, March 31, 2006, p. 9. Pertinently, in this fairly recent case, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and reinstated with modification the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. The Office of the Ombudsman imposed upon the respondent the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits equivalent to twelve months salary and temporary disqualification for re-employment in the government for one year from finality of the decision. The Court affirmed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman with the modification that, in addition to the penalty imposed, respondent shall likewise pay a fine of five thousand pesos.